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With the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), Leeper-Sims-Woodford (LSW) argued 
that the government budget constraint plays a key role in determining the price level. 
Indeed, there could even be a dispute vis-à-vis the role of monetary policy in the 
formation of the price level. Apart from several theoretical criticisms, also addressed in 
the discussion given in this paper, the attempts to validate empirically the novel theory 
are, so far, rather sparse. Additionally, one of the purposes of this paper is to tentatively 
assess the possible empirical evidence, concerning the FTPL, for the EU-15 countries. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
The fiscal theory of price level (FTPL), developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and 
Woodford (1994, 1995), relates to an already well known discussion in the literature, 
about whether fiscal policy plays a role, as important as monetary policy, in determining 
the price level.1 There is also a connection to the controversy concerning the use of rules 
to determine the nominal interest rate, that, as mentioned by Sargent and Wallace 
(1975), leave the price level undetermined, therefore LSW argue that the government 
budget constraint is crucial for the price level determination.2  
 
The main point behind the FTPL is indeed the idea that the price level is determined 
through the inter-temporal government budget constraint. That is, the price level adjusts 
in order to assure that the value of nominal government debt, divided by the price level, 
equals the real present value of future budget surpluses. In other words, the price level 
equals the ratio of nominal government liabilities to the present value of future budget 
surpluses in real terms.  
 
The literature on the FTPL has increased substantially, rendering difficult an exercise of 
keeping up with all the incoming references on the topic. Nevertheless, one can mention 
namely some papers by Woodford (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2001), Cochrane (1999, 2000, 
2001) and Sims (1999). The use of the FTPL in an international framework - two 
countries, exchange rate determination, and monetary union - is discussed by Woodford 
(1996), Sims (1997, 1999), Dupor (2000), Bergin (2000), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 
(2001), Andrés, Ballabriga and Vallés (2000) and Daniel (2001). Loyo (2000) addresses 
the inflationary episodes in Brazil using the FTPL while Sims (2001) makes a similar 
attempt to assess the consequences of dollarization in Mexico. Also in the context of the 
                                                        
1 The expressions "fiscal theory of price determination" (see Canzoneri and Diba (1999)) or "fiscal 
theory of money" (see Marimon (1999)) appear also in the literature. Coleman (1995) favours the 
use of the terminology “fiscal regime of price level determination.” 
2 According to Buiter (1999) the inspiring contribution is credited to Begg and Haque (1984), even 
if this is a less mentioned paper in the literature. As a matter of fact, and as Auernheimer and 
Contreras (1991) mention, "An understandable reason why the Begg and Haque results are not cited 
in any of the current literature is that they were published in a journal of limited audience. In fact, we 




FTPL, Corsetti and Mackowiak (2000) discuss and relate the occurrence of currency 
devaluations to the existence of fiscal unbalances.  
 
Critical discussions of the theory and of its assumptions are offered namely by 
McCallum (1999a, 1999b, 2001), Buiter (1998, 1999, 2001) and Bassetto (2001), while 
explanations of the theory can be found in Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Christiano 
and Fitzgerald (2000) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000). Concerning the empirical 
testing of the theory, the literature is rather small, but one can mention the papers of 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1997, 2000), Cochrane (1999) and Woodford (1999), 
Mélitz (2000) and Creel and Sterdyniak (2000). 
 
This paper adds to the literature, by offering a critical discussion of the theory and by 
trying to assess the empirical evidence concerning the feasibility of the FTPL, for the 
EU-15 countries, with panel data estimations. The remaining of the paper is as follows. 
Section two presents the FTPL, section three gives a critical overview of FTPL, section 
four tentatively evaluates the empirical evidence for the EU-15, and section five is the 
conclusion. 
  
2 – The fiscal theory of the price level set-up 
 
Underlying the work developed by LSW, is the idea that for some combinations of 
fiscal and monetary policy, the price level is determined by the ratio between 
government nominal liabilities and the real present value of future government assets 
(budget surpluses). This is an important issue since central banks seem to be now less 
enthusiastic in using monetary rules for their monetary policy decisions. The 
implementation of such rules is usually regarded as an attempt to capture the visible 
historical relationship between money and prices. 
 
2.1 – Ricardian versus non-Ricardian regimes 
  
The set-up for the FTPL may be understood on the basis of the categorization of two 
types of fiscal regimes, the way is done for instance by Woodford (1995): Ricardian 
versus non-Ricardian regimes. Actually, this classification had already been done by 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) who maintained that in a non-Ricardian regime the 
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Treasury does not commit itself to match completely, in the future, new public debt 
with future taxes, since some part of the new debt is to be financed through money, the 
opposite of what would happen in a Ricardian regime. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2001) assume also this kind of classification. 
 
In a Ricardian regime, primary budget balances respond to the level of government debt 
in order to ensure budget solvency. In this case, money and price level may be 
determined by the supply and demand of money and one may consider that there is an 
active monetary policy/strategy. In other words, one is assuming that the effects of 
government deficits on prices, interest rates and income are irrelevant, in line with the 
Ricardian equivalence assumptions.  
 
Indeed, in a non-Ricardian regime, the government could determine primary budget 
balances, regardless of the level o public debt. In this case, money and prices would 
adjust to the level of public debt in order to ensure the fulfilment of the government 
budget constraint. This is the main characteristic of the FTPL. 
 
Canzoneri and Diba (1996) use another terminology, already adopted by Sargent and 
Wallace (1981). While the Ricardian regime is tagged as a "regime of monetary 
predominance", since money demand and supply determine in this case the price level, 
the non-Ricardian regime is labelled "a regime of fiscal predominance," as prices are 
now endogenously determined from the government budget constraint. 
 
Buiter (1999) offers several criticisms against the FTPL, and also deals with this issue 
as an opposition between two fiscal rules for the government behaviour: the government 
might follow a “Ricardian fiscal rule” or a “non-Ricardian fiscal rule.” Implicit in the 
use of the Ricardian rule is the hypothesis that the inter-temporal government budget 
constraint will be fulfilled for all the sequences of endogenous variables. In the case of a 
non-Ricardian rule there is implicitly the assumption that the inter-temporal government 
budget constraint is only met for equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. The 
several expressions used in the literature, to label the two regimes of fiscal and 
monetary policy, are summarized in Table 1. 
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Leeper (1991) Passive strategy from 
the Treasury; 
Active strategy from the 
Central Bank 
versus Active strategy from the 
Treasury; 
Passive strategy from the 
Central Bank 
Aiyagari and Gertler 
(1985), Woodford (1995) 
Ricardian regime versus Non-Ricardian regime 




versus Fiscal regime dominance 
Buiter (1999) Ricardian fiscal rule versus Non-Ricardian fiscal rule 
 
Going back to the “game of chicken” mentioned by Sargent (1986), about the “dispute” 
between the Treasury and the Central Bank, the quantitative money equation and the 
government budget constraint equation may reflect the effects, upon the price level, of 
the preponderance of either a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime. 
  
Therefore, in a regime where the monetary policy is independent (active), as in a 
Ricardian regime, the monetary authority determines the money stock and the price 
level through a money demand equation, based on the quantitative theory of money. 
The government is in this case required  to attain primary budget surpluses, in order that 
its budget constraint is consistent with the price level resulting from the money demand 
equation. There is then, according to Leeper’s (1991) terminology, a passive strategy 
from the Treasury and an active behaviour from the Central Bank.3 
 
In a non-Ricardian regime, where the Treasury decides autonomously the values of the 
budget deficit and of the public debt, the price level may be determined independently 
from the monetary authority. In this case, the Central Bank assumes a passive attitude, 
money supply is endogenous, and the price level is determined by the government 
budget constraint.4 The FTPL could then be appropriate if the government did not 
choose a passive fiscal policy, that is, when the budget surpluses are not adjusted 
endogenously in order that the budget constraint satisfies the price level implicit in the 
money demand function. 
                                                        
3 Dotsey (1996) distinguishes between independent and dependent monetary policy. 
4 For instance Cochrane (1998) argues that the government budget constraint "will determine the 
price level no matter what the rest of the economy looks like (...)." 
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This framework has some reminiscence of the popular unpleasant monetarist arithmetic 
case of Sargent and Wallace (1981), which is basically the result of a situation where 
the monetary authority reacts passively to an active fiscal policy put forward by the 
government. In fact, in the set-up of Sargent and Wallace, there is first an atempt by the 
authorities to implement simultaneously a regime of fiscal dominance and a regime of 
monetary dominance. However, even in the context of the unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic, in the end, inflation is still viewed as a monetary result. With the FTPL 
hypothesis, fiscal policy may determine the price level even if there are no changes in 
the money stock.  
 
For instance, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) classify the approach of Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) as the “weak-form” of the FTPL, since even if the exogenous fiscal policy 
infuences prices, this is done through the money suply, which is endogenous. In the 
more recent LSW explanation, fiscal policy determines the price level independently of 
the money supply, leading Carlstrom and Fuerst to label this approach as the “strong-
form” of the FTPL. 
 
Also, Gordon and Leeper (2000) assume three versions of the FTPL; the first one 
explained along the lines of the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) who, like Aiyagari 
and Gertler (1985), argue that inflation remains essentially a monetary matter, even 
though there are constraints imposed by fiscal policy. The second version would be the 
one defended by the work of Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 1995) 
that call attention upon the fact that money, public debt, and fiscal policy, jointly 
determine the price level. Still a third version of the FTPL seems to be discussed by 
Woodford (1995, 1998a) and Sims (1997), who try to establish that the equilibrium 
price level may be determined only by fiscal variables, in other words, the price level 
would be independent from the path of money stock. Additionally, Cochrane (1999) 
suggests a more controversial version of the FTPL, where the existence o money is 
superfluous, and where monetary policy would be unimportant to historically explain 
inflation.5 
 
                                                        
5 Bohn (1999) and Woodford (1998) give some critical comments on this extreme version of the 
FTPL. 
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2.2 - The critics from the fiscal theory to the monetarist explanation 
 
The FTPL argues against the assumption, suggested namely by Friedman, that inflation 
is purely a monetary problem. For instance, Woodford (1995) questions the idea, keen 
to the quantitative theory of money, that the Central Bank should control the money 
stock in order to attain price level objectives. The proponents of the FTPL maintain that 
even if there is no change in money stock, fiscal policy may independently affect the 
price level and the inflation rate. This situation may arise either from the possibility that 
the Central Bank does not control the money supply, or due to the hypothesis that 
inflation may not, in fact, be a monetary issue.  
 
When there is an increase in the price level, there will be as a consequence the decline 
of the real value of the government liabilities, understood here as the pooled liabilities 
of both the Treasury and the Central Bank. These liabilities comprise therefore the stock 
of government debt, in possession of the public, and the stock of monetary base. As a 
result of the price level rise, there is a negative wealth effect through the reduction of 
the real value of the individuals applications, for instance in government debt. Hence, 
there may occur a decrease of aggregate demand, with prices adjusting aggregate 
demand and supply in the short run. For instance, with a fixed money supply, the 
increase of the budget deficit may be accompanied by the rise of  prices, allowing the 
decrease of the real value of public debt, in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the 
government budget constraint. 
 
Following the above reasoning, one may recall the weak correlation between money and 
prices since the start of the 80s, in most of the industrialized countries, with the 
progressive abandon of monetary aggregates as an intermediate objective of monetary 
policy.6 This is for example (see Figure 1) the case of the US where there seems 
                                                        
6 "Throughout the English-speaking world, at least, central bankers have abandoned the notion that 
any of the conventional monetary aggregates constitute a suitable intermediate target for monetary 
policy. This has resulted from the discovery that these aggregates no longer appear to have any very 
reliable relationship, at least in the short run, with the variables, such as inflation and real activity, 
about which policymakers actually care" (see Woodford (1998b)). The same point is made by Romer 
(2000): “(…) most central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, now play little attention to 
monetary aggregates in conducting policy.” 
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obvious the lack of a positive relationship between inflation and monetary base since 
the begining of the 80s.7 
 







































Source: European Economy 72, 2001. European Commission (inflation); 
Federal Reserve Statistics Release, Historical Data, H.3 (Monetary Base). 
 
Of course, and as stressed by Cochrane (1999, 2000), the specification of a money 
demand equation, through which prices are supposed to be monitored according to the 
quantitative theory, implies that fiscal policy will afterwards adjust endogenously to the 
resulting price level.  
 
Lets now consider the traditional relation of the quantitative theory of money, between 
money and income,  
 tttt yPvM =  (1) 
 
where M is nominal money, P is the price level, y is real income and v stands for the 
income-velocity of money.8 Assuming, for instance, that the income-velocity of money 
depends on the nominal interest rate, vt=v(it),
9 
                                                        
7 Dwyer and Hafer (1999) review some of the latest evidence concerning the relationship between 
monetary growth and inflation. 
8 Naturally, the classic reference for the identity of the quantitative theory of money is Fisher (1911, 
p. 24-32). The relationship between real money and income may also be presented as M/P = ky 





tt yPiM =)(  (2) 
b>0, 
 
using logarithms and the real effective interest rate, r, with perfect prediction, it is 
possible to write 
 
 [ ]tttttt PPrbyPM lnlnlnlnlnln 1 −+−+= + . (3) 
 
For simplification sake, it is possible to assume that income, the money supply and the 
real interest rate are constant, 
 
 [ ]ttt PPrbyPM lnlnlnlnlnln 1 −+−+= +  (4) 
 
and then we have the following difference equation for the price level 
 







=−+ . (5) 
 
Hence, according to the initial price level, there is an infinite number of possible 
trajectories for the previous equation. The usual solution is to assume/choose the initial 
price level obtained from 
 
 ryMP ln)/ln(ln 0 −= , (6) 
 
in order to ensure that the price equation does not lead to an explosive trajectory. One of 
the critics put forward by Woodford (1994, 1995), is that this choice for the initial price 
level has no support on economic theory and it is not derived, for instance, from some 
money demand function optimisation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 A hypothesis used namely by Cochrane (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). 
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One of the results of the monetarist theory is that the use of rules to determine the 
interest rate ends up in an indeterminacy for the price level, and the Central Bank may 
eventually loose control of the inflation rate. In fact, in this case, money supply is 
hopeless to uniquely determine the price level. The classic text is Sargent and Wallace 
(1975), where it is shown that price level is indeterminate when an interest rate rule is 
used and when prices are flexible. A clear exposition of this point is given namely by 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 577-582), but the issue can be tracked back to Wicksell 
(1965 [1898], 1907).10 
 
However, the point made by LSW is that if consumers are non-Ricardian, and in the 
context of a non-Ricardian fiscal regime, the wealth effects should show up through 
nominal government debt, with the government budget constraint  being then used to 
determine a unique price level. Therefore, the proponents of the FTPL defend that the 




















where Bt stands for the government nominal liabilities in period t, including the stock of 
public debt (for simplicity one year securities) and monetary base; st is the primary 
budget government surplus in period t, including seigniorage revenues, in real terms; r 

















A possible analogy for the government budget constraint may be to think of the stock of 
public debt as a government bond, with periodic coupon payments, and where the 
primary budget surpluses are the coupons. In this case, the changes in the price level can 
be considered as resulting from the variations in the market value of this special 
government bond. 
                                                        
10 This topic attracts attention from economists on a regular basis. See for instance Patinkin (1965) 
and Bénassy (2000). 
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However, it is relevant to bear in mind that fiscal and monetary policy, directly or 
indirectly, both end up being responsible for the fulfilment of the government budget 
constraint. Equation (7) will be successfully met if the government adopts a non-
Ricardian fiscal policy, using Woodford’s terminology. Therefore, after the government 
having arbitrarly chosen a sequence of fiscal balances, by choosing the level of public 
expenditures, the price level will adjust endogenously to ensure compliance with the 
budget constraint. In other words, if equation (7) is to be met for any value of price 
level, than fiscal policy must adjust passively (Leeper [1991]), in line with a Ricardian 
regime (Woodford [1995]). 
 
2.3 - The price level fiscal theory approach 
 
For the presentation of the FTPL framework, lets assume a model of numerous and 
infinitely lived households that maximize an utility function with money as an 
argument. This type of money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) model is inspired in 
Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975) and the utility function of the consumers, supposed 
to be additive, may be written as  
 
 ησ ησ −−−− −+−= 12
11
1
1 )1()1(),( tttt mAcAmcU , (9) 
σ>0; η>0; 
 
where ct is consumption in real terms in period t, mt = Mt/Pt, and M is the nominal stock 
of money.11 
 










)( 11  (10) 
 
                                                        
11 The utility function used here (inspired in McCallum (1999a)) is basically a parametric version of 
the general formulations used by Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1995). 
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where y is the output, assumed constant, txt  are the lump-sum taxes paid in t, Bt stands 
for one period government debt securities, outstanding in period t, and i is the nominal 
interest rate.  
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mcU , (14) 
 
the usual Euler equation, now depicting addionally the use o money in the households 
utility function. 
 
The consolidated government budget constraint (including the Central Bank) is as 
follows, 
                                                        
12 It is assumed that 11 ++ = t
e











)( 11 , (15) 
 
with the budget deficit financed, either by the issuance of money, either by the issuance 
of public debt. Bt+1 are government bonds issued in period t, at price 1/(1+it), to be 
reimbursed in period t+1 for one monetary unit, and gt and txt are respectively the 
government expenditure and taxes in real terms, in period t. The budget constraints of 
the households and of the government imply the following equilibrium condition for the 
goods and services market in the economy, after adding (10) and (15), 
 
 tt gcy += . (16) 
 





























































1  (18) 
 
and, using once more the definitions bt = Bt/Pt and mt = Mt/Pt, it is possible to write the 





















1 . (19) 
 




ttt ri +++=+ π  (20) 
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and supposing that the price level is correctly predicted for t+1, that is, assuming 
perfect forecast for the expected inflation rate, et 1+π (with 11 ++ = t
e











11 ππ , (21) 
 




















ri 1)1(1 ++=+ . (23) 
 
Bringing to mind the situation mentioned above, where the monetary base growth rate is 





















 ))(1()1(1 tttttt txgrbrb −+++=+  (25) 
 
and, assuming also the hypothesis of a constant real interest rate, we finally get 
 
 ))(1()1(1 tttt txgrbrb −+++=+ . (26) 
 
Additionally, and for simplicity, if the budget deficit is stable, )()( txgtxg tt −=− , we 
have also 
 
 ))(1()1(1 txgrbrb tt −+++=+ , (27) 
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and, from the the last expression, it becomes clear that bt = Bt/Pt will follow an 
explosive trajectory since (1+r)>0. Figure 2 illustrates the government fiscal constraint 
and the evolution of the stock of public debt, based on equation (27), which can be 
written succinctly as  
 
 ))(1(1 sbrb tt −+=+  (28) 
 
where the primary budget surplus, s, is given by s = tx-g.  
 




Starting from an initial value for bt in the horizontal axis, going perpendicularly up to 
the line (in full) of the budget constraint and then horizontally to the 45 degrees line, 
and then again vertically to the budget constraint line, it is easy to witness the explosive 
evolution of government debt. 
 
If there is an initial value for the stock of real government debt, bo, below b*, b diverges 
into an area of negative values, which would be inconsistent with the non-negativity  
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restriction for the stock of real public debt. For b > b*, the stock of real public debt 
diverges also, and the value follows an explosive path. Notice that the growth rate of 










−+=+ , (29) 
 
that eventually converges to (1+r) while b increases. However, in this case, the 
government is conducting Ponzi games, and it would no be possible to satisfy a 
transversality condition such as the one given by equation (8). 
 
An explosive situation for the stock of real government debt will be avoided if the initial 
value for b , b0=b
*, is  
 
 rtxgrb /))(1(0 −+−= , (30) 
 
in order to ensure that b remains constant at that same value.13 As a matter of fact, with 















 += . (31) 
 
Therefore, according to the FTPL, P0 is determined by the previous expressions and is 
given by  
 
 [ ]))(1(/00 gtxrrBP −+= , (32) 
 
                                                        
13 To prevent the explosive outcome underlying ))(1()1(1 txgrbrb tt −+++=+ , it is necessary that 
the starting point fulfils the following condition: ))(1()1( 00 txgrbrb −+++= , simplifying, it is 
required that rtxgrb /))(1(0 −+−= . In this case it is also easy to verify that we will have 
b0=b1=...=bn. 
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in other words, the price level is endogenously determined from the ratio between the 
initial public debt level and the government balance.14 
 
3 - A critical discussion of the fiscal theory 
 
As already mentioned, the FTPL sees the price level as resulting from fiscal policy 
decisions, in contrast with the monetarist explanation of the quantitative theory of 
money. In a Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, the nominal value of 
government debt (or in a broader sense the government liabilities) results from the 
accumulation of budget deficits. If the price level is determined by the quantitative 
theory of money, the real value for the stock of public debt comes out endgenously and 
the present value of future budget surpluses must adjust in order to meet the government 
budget constraint. 
  
In the case of a non-Ricardian regime, of fiscal dominance, the real value of the stock of 
public debt is determined by the present value of future budget surpluses, and the price 
level that must adjust to gurantee the fulfilment of the budget government constraint. 
What we have here is then two different interpretations on how the adjustment of the 
several variables takes place in the framework of the government budget constraint. For 
instance, Cochrane (2001) maintains that Ricardian regimes are backward-looking, in 
the sense that the real values of the stock of public debt is determined by the price level 
and by past budget deficits, while a non-Ricardian regime is forward-looking, since it is 
now the real value of the stock of public debt, set accordingly with the present value of 
future budget surpluses, that will determine the price level. 
 
Price level indetermination is directly related to the fact that the Central Bank may use 
monetary policy to determine the nominal interest rate. In this case, with the nominal 
interest rate set exogenously by the monetary authority, the equation of the quantitative 
theory of money, equation (1), and the equation for the price level change, equation 
(23), are used to determine the money stock and the price level (assuming a constant 
real interest rate). However, equation (23) only determines the inflation rate and not the 
price level, that is, Pt is undetermined. In this situation, the relation of the quantitative 
                                                        
14 Sims (1997, p. 8) labels this approach as “"quantity theory of [public] debt" determination of the 
price level.” 
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theory of money determines the money stock in a passive way, which adjusts to the 
desired interest rate level, but it is unable to determine the price level. This 
undetermination may be solved through the government budget constraint, equation (7), 
that now determines the price level, the solution forwarded by the proponents of the 
FTPL.15 
 
As an alternative, if the monetary authority decides to determine the money supply, 
then, in a Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, equations (1) and (23) may 
determine with no further problems the price level and the nominal interest rate. In this 
case, the government budget constraint is always satisfied and will not be used to 
determine the price level. Also, if the Central Bank tries to set an objective for the 
money supply, when the government is carrying out an active fiscal policy, that is, a 
non-Ricardian regime, the price level may be overdetermined. Table 2 summarises these 
results. 
 
Table 2 – Fiscal determination of price level and monetary policy 
The monetary authority tries to set:  
the nominal interest rate a monetary aggregate 
Ricardian regime, 
monetary dominance 
In this case the price level 
is undetermined (*) 
The price level is 
determined, using the 




The price level may be 
determined by the 
government budget 
constraint (**) 
The price level is 
overdetermined 
 (*) The case mentioned by Sargent and Wallace (1975). 
 (**) Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994,1995). 
 
Buiter (1998, 1999, 2001), one of the critics of the FTPL, argues that the theory 
proposed by the work of LSW is what he calls “the pure fiscal theory of the initial price 
level” (Buiter [1998, pp. 25]). In fact, Buiter (1998) mentions that the initial price level 
is determined by equation (31) and is proportional to the stock of non-monetary 
liabilities (public debt), and this could be understood strictly as what the author 
mentions as the “quantity theory of nominal bonds.” However, and taking into account 
the initial price level, in the following periods prices will be determined by equation 
                                                        
15 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) discuss the issue o nominal and 
real indeterminacy in MIUF models. 
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(23). Besides, the nominal stock of money has an effect on the nominal interest rate, 
that is, for a given level of public debt and prices, an increase of the money stock 
implies a decrease of the nominal interest rate and, with a constant real interest rate, 
there should be a decrease of the future nominal value of government debt. The decline 
of public debt will then lower the price level, and so Buiter maintains that money still 
influences prices. 
  
Buiter stresses also the fact that it does not seem reasonable that the government uses 
the budget constraint (7) to determine the primary balance and the issuance of public 
debt, without taking into account a given price level. Also, the models presented by the 
proponents of the FTPL, give the impression that they are determining a level of public 
debt default and not so much the price level. If the responsibles of economic policy 
were to adopt the ideas of the FTPL, there would end up to appear either situations of 
default on public debt reimbursements or situations of hyperinflation. 
  
Cochrane (2000) answers back to Buiter’s criticisms by saying that Buiter is taking for 
granted a Walrasian formation of prices in the market, were no transaction occurs until 
the adequate price level is met, in order to validate the budget constraint. However,  and 
since it is not possible to know beforehand which is that price level, nothing will 
prevent the government of deciding the indebtedness level and the primary balance that 
it wishes to assume. If the government did behave like Buiter seems to be suggesting, 
disregarding market restrictions, the level of public debt might rise without limit when, 
in fact, the equilibrium price level is adjusted to prevent that such boundless increase of 
government debt might occur. 
 
Cushing (1999) argues that in a non-Ricardian regime, chacterized by an active fiscal 
policy, the fiscal determination of the price level requires some rather implausible 
assumptions. For instance, in order to determine the price level through the 
intertemporal budget constraint, it is necessary for the consumers to believe that the 
government will honour its debts, even when the stock of public debt rises to very high 
levels. If there is a significant risk that those debts are not paid, the government may 
have to change the way it conducts fiscal policy, to ensure that its intertemporal budget 
constraint is not violated, since the alternative, a price level increase, would reduce the 
real value of debt to be reimbursed to the public, that might not buy, in the future, new 
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government debt in the market. In these circumstances, the price level would not be 
determined by the government budget constraint, instead, the price level ends up being a 
restriction to which that constraint must obey. Cushing (1999), as well as McCallum 
(1999a), criticise therefore the FTPL supposition of the transversality condition and the 
hypothesis that the stock of public debt is on a convergence path. In a non-Ricardian 
regime, neither the government nor the Central Bank are committed to ensure that 
convergence process, however, the public is supposed to believe that the government 
will not default in the future on its liabilities. 
 
The essence of the FTPL, in its criticism of the quantitative theory of money, does not 
seem to be to figure out if the quantitative equation of money links or not the price level 
with the stock of money, but really to discuss if the stock of money and the price level 
may be determined by fiscal policy. However, to distinguish between if the supply of 
money and the interest rate are determined by fiscal policy or if the money supply and 
interest rate are determined exogenously, it is not an easy point to assess only under 
theoretical grounds.  
 
In empirical terms, there appears to be some evidence that could be read as being for 
and against the FTPL. For instance, the well known cases of hyperinflation in Europe in 
the beginning of the 20th century, discussed by Cagan (1956) and by Sargent (1982), 
seem to indicate that the inflationary periods of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Poland 
were only surpassed after the problems in terms of fiscal deficits had been delt with. 
When studying the monetary characteristics of hyperinflations in Austria, Hungary, 
Poland and Russia in the 20s and in Greece, Hungary and Russia in the 40s, Cagan 
(1956) used models for money demand based on the strong relation existing between 
money and inflation.16 In Cagan’s (1956, p. 85) words, it is possible to understand the 
idea that the government financing needs were one of the causes of hyperinflation: 
 
“(…) taxes yielded some revenue, of course, though presumably an amount 
insufficient for desired total expenditures. As the rate of price increase rose, 
however, the real value of whatever funds were raised by other taxes 
                                                        
16 A posteriori, the econometric problems of those models were pointed out namely by McCallum 
(1989). 
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undoubtedly diminished, and during the later stages of hyperinflation these funds 
must have become nearly worthless owing to delays in collecting them.” 
 
Loyo (2000) explains the hyperinflation of Brazil in 1975-1985 as a result a of a vicious 
circle between the nominal growth of government debt and the corresponding rollover 
of existing debt. Also, Woodford (1999, pp. 393) maintains that fiscal policy in the US 
might have been non-Ricardian before 1951: “That period would represent a historical 
example of the kind of interest-rate pegging regime for which the theory was 
developed.”17 
 
In the first half of the 70s, the idea of a regime of fiscal dominance, Ricardian in 
Woodford’s terminology, may be relevant, since there was a decline of fiscal balances 
and an increase of inflation, namely in Italy and in the UK, see Figure 3 and Figure 4, 
and also for instance in the US. Also, and as mentioned by Sargent (1987), the fact that 
the government budget constraint is pratically absent from macroeconomic models in 
the 60s and 70s, may be an indication that the budget constraint was then seen more like 
an equilibrium condition and less as constraint. 
 


















































Source: European Economy 72, 2001. European Commission. 
 
                                                        
17 It was in March 1951 that was made the accord between the US Treasury and the Central Bank in 
order to give the Central Bank more autonomy to change interest rates, Hetzel and Leach (2001) 
give a reading of the implications of that agreement. 
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Source: European Economy 72, 2001. European Commission. 
 
In the beginning of the 80s there was an increase of budget deficits in several western 
economies. According to the assumptions of the FTPL, there should have been a price 
level rise in order to reduce the government liabilities in real terms. For instance, in 
Italy, see Figure 3, there was a decline of inflation throughout the 80s, what seems to 
disagree with the FTPL.  
 
This sort of interpretations is rejected by Cochrane (1999) who tries to reconcile these 
data with the FTPL, arguing that real primary deficits determined inflation, since after 
the middle of the 80s there were improved expectations concerning future budget 
surpluses. Hence, when there are changes in the expectations about the level of future 
budget balances, the present value of fiscal balances is also adjusted, and this must be 
reflected on the change of the government liabilities, through price level changes. 
Therefore, with this reasoning, it is interesting to mention that in the 90s, at the same 
time that the US budget deficit declined, becoming even a surplus after 1998, it was 
possible to see a sustained decrease of the inflation rate. 
 
Also, it is also relevant to distinguish between the money measure included in the 
equation of the quantitative theory of money and the monetary liability used in the 
government budget constraint. Indeed, in the equation of the quantitative theory of 
money, for instance equation (1), money is seen as a broader monetary aggregate (M1, 
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M2 or even M3) than the monetary base used to to quantify the seigniorage revenues in 
the government budget constraint, equation (7). 
 
Assume, for example, that the monetary authority reduces the money supply. If there is 
a Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, the decrease of money supply should result 
in a drop of the price level. Notice also that this price level decline will bring about an 
increase of the real value of the outstanding stock of public debt, and, in the future, the 
government will have either to raise taxes or to cut public expenditures, in order to meet 
the budget constraint. 
 
If there is a non-Ricardian regime, of fiscal dominance, a decrease in the money supply 
dose not affect the price level since this variable is now determined through equation 
(31). However, the equilibrium price level should now be smaller than the one that was 
in place previously to the money supply cut, in other words, there might be too much 
inflation. This situation would be possible if the government did not obey, for some 
time, its budget constraint. The budget constraint would then only be fulfilled for a 
long-run equilibrium situation, which seems to be a rather strong assumption. As a 
matter of fact, the government budget constraint is, by construction, an identity that 
should hold at any point in time. Eventually, if for instance the reduction of money 
supply was associated to a tax raise, then the money supply decrease would end up in a 
price level fall, either through money demand, based on the quantitative theory of 
money, where prices decrease on a one to one basis with the change of money stock, 
either through equation (31). 
 
The main feature of the government budget constraint, the fact that public debt can not 
go beyond the value of present and future budget surpluses, should be met, either in 
equilibrium or not. This characteristic of the government constraint does not seem to be 
adopted by the proponents of the FTPL, who assume that the budget constraint must be 
fulfilled only in equilibrium, a hypothesis that is hard to sustain. See for example the 
comments forwarded by Woodford (1998a, p. 17-18)): 
 
“Note that our argument does not involve any denial that the value of the public 
debt must actually equal the present value of future government budget 
surpluses, in equilibrium. What we deny is that condition (1.14) [the initial value 
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of public debt is equal to the present value of current and future budget 
surpluses plus seigniorage] is a constraint upon government fiscal policy, that 
must be expected to hold regardless of the evolution of goods prices and asset 
prices. Instead of a "government budget constraint", the condition is properly 
viewed as an equilibrium condition, that follows from the joint requirements of 
private sector optimisation and market clearing.”18  
 
Still another point assumed by the FTPL is also open to criticism: the assumption that 
the government allways intends to rollover a fraction of the outstanding stock of public 
debt. However, if the successive budget surpluses allow to significantly reduce the stock 
of public debt, the hypothesis that the price level is determined by the intertemporal 
government budget constraint, equation (7), implies that the price level would approach 
zero. Notice that some of the EU-15 countries (for instance Ireland, Denmark, Finland, 
United Kingdom) countries and the US, had in the last years consecutive budget 
surpluses, resulting in the reduction of the stock of public debt, without significant 
changes in the inflation rate. 
 
Additionally, a contribution for an increase of inflation might be the occurrence of 
defaults on interest rate payments and reimbursements of public debt. These situations 
may then reduce the present value of future budget surpluses and the price level would 
then have to rise to ensure once more the fulfilment of the intertemporal government 
budget constraint.19 
 
4 - Validation of the fiscal theory of the price level 
 
Regarding the empirical validation of the FTPL, Cochrane (1999) doubts of the interest 
of that validation, that is, of the interest in assessing empirically the suitability of a non-
Ricardian regime, since the causal relations between the several variables can never be 
rejected/accepted without making use of additional assumptions, frequently stemming 
from the hypothesis itself made about the fiscal regime that is tested. It seems however 
                                                        
18 Still on the budget constraint, it does not seem clear the idea forwarded by Cochrane (2000) that 
sees the constraint not as a restriction but like a “government valuation equation.” 
19 Kenc, Perraudin and Vitale (2000) mention this point. 
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that this is also true with the identity of the quantitative theory of money and the 
resulting money demand functions.  
 
For example, Woodford (1995) also contends that it does no make much sense to test in 
empirical terms the FTPL. The line of reasoning provided is based on the idea that all 
monetary regimes, monetary rules ourmoney demand specifications leave the price level 
undetermined, and consequently the price level can only be determined by the fiscal 
policy.20 
 
The solution of trying to validate the FTPL through the inspection of budget deficits and 
government debt, a possible empirical approach, is not easy since in a non-Ricardian 
regime there is solely the guarantee that the government budget constraint is obeyed in 
equilibrium (see Cochrane [1999] and Woodford [1998a]). This conviction is also 
criticised by Buiter (1999) who says that “…the government's intertemporal budget 
constraint is a constraint on the government's instruments that must be satisfied for all 
admissible values of the economy-wide endogenous variables.” 
  
The government budget constraint, equation (7), and the usual transversality condition, 
equation (8), may give a suggestion on how to assess the adjustment process of the main 
fiscal variables. A possible method would be to try to understand wether is the price 
level that adjusts to the future fiscal surpluses, or if it is the trajectory of fiscal surpluses 
that adjusts to the price level. 
 
In a Ricardian regime, it is assumed that government debt is not seen as wealth, and that 
the public takes for granted that the government eventually will adjust its strategy to be 
consistent with the transversality condition and fiscal policy sustainability. It is 
nevertheless possible that in some periods, the budget surpluses do not seem adequate to 
keep the debt-to-GDP ratio under acceptable limits. However, even in that 
circumstance, there might not be a price level increase. 
 
In a non-Ricardian regime it is expected that the transversality condition be met in 
equilibrium, and that the stock of public debt may temporarily show values that are 
                                                        
20 Korcherlakota and Phelan (1999) are also sceptical as to the feasibility of the empirical validation 
of the FTPL. 
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inconsistent with such a condition. In this case, even if the debt-to-GDP ratio is rather 
high,  and if there is a wealth effect from government debt, there might be an increase of 
aggregate demand resulting in the rise of the price level. The real value of the 
government liabilities would then be reduced, allowing once more the formation of 
favourable expectations as to the fulfilment of the transversality condition. 
 
Following what was just mentioned if, for example, there is some empirical evidence in 
favour of the stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio, that evidence may not be 
incompatible with the existence of a non-Ricardian regime, as it is understood in the 
context of the FTPL. In other words, econometric evidence about the satationarity of 
public debt or about the sustainability of fiscal policy is not conclusive in distinguishing 
between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes.21 
 
4.1 - Budget deficits and public debt 
 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2000) use a bivariate VAR test for the existence of a 
Ricardian regime, by assessing if the primary budget surplus, as a percentage of GDP, 
negatively influences the government liabilities, also as a ratio of GDP. In the 
government liabilities are included both public debt and monetary base. In a regime of 
monetary dominance, a Ricardian regime, the positive changes in the budget surplus 
should be used to pay back some of the outstanding public debt, that is, one would 
expect to see an inverse relationship between the primary budget surplus and the 






















2220  (35) 
 
                                                        
21 Woodford (1998) discusses this point with some detail. Afonso (2000) presents some results 
concerning fiscal policy sustainability in the EU-15 countries. 
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where s is the primary budget surplus, in real terms, as a percentage of GDP, including 
seigniorage revenues and w is the government liabilities, in real terms, as a percentage 
of GDP, including public debt and monetary base. 
 
In such a set-up, the hypothesis of a Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, could 
not be rejected when a2i < 0 (and probably a1i > 0 would be also true), in other words, 
the increase of budget surpluses is used to cut down government debt. If, however, we 
get 02 ≥ia , then it is possible that there is in place a non-Ricardian regime, that is, a 
regime of fiscal dominance.  
 
Still another test for the validation of the FTPL is to assess if b1i = 0. If the budget 
surplus does not react systematically to the level of public debt, then the price level 
could be determined by the government budget constraint, and not by money demand 
and money supply. In this case, the price level may change to adjust the real value of the 
stock of public debt to the present value of the future primary budget surplus. If, 
however, one observe that b1i > 0, this could mean that the government tries to increase 
the budget surpluses in order to diminish the existing stock of public debt and comply 
with the budget constraint. 
 
With annual data for the US, for the period 1951-1995, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 
(2000) mention that positive shocks in the primary budget surplus, decrease the real 
value of the stock of public debt (a2i < 0), and therefore they conclude for the existence 
of Ricardian regime, with the Treasury assuming a passive strategy and the Central 
Bank assuming an active strategy. Also, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba  (1997) mention 
that it does not seem to be any empirical evidence concerning the existence of a regime 
of fiscal dominance in the OECD countries.  
 
Cochrane (1999) uses also a VAR model, with a single lag, with the following 
variables: public debt as a percentage of private consumption, the budget surplus-private 
consumption ratio,  the consumption rate growth and the real interest rate implicit in the 
stock of public debt. With annual data for the US, for the period 1960-1996, they 
conclude that positive changes in the budget surplus reduce the stock of public debt, a 
result similar to the one reported by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2000). Woodford 
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(1999) reaches the same conclusions as Cochrane (1999), with the same data and 
variables, with the exception that the real interest rate is discarded, on the basis that it 
should be implicit in the evolution of the other three variables (see Woodford [1999]).22 
 
Other empirical work, that relate to this discussion, is provided by Debrun and Wyplosz 
(1999) and Mélitz (2000) who estimate reaction functions respectively for the UE-12 
and OECD countries, in order to evaluate if the primary budget surplus responds 
positively to the level of government debt. According to the results presented by those 
authors, there seems to be a statistically significant positive relation between public debt 
and the primary budget surplus, being therefore impossible to conclude that 
governments do not take into account their respective intertemporal budget constrainst. 
In other words, fiscal policy might have been implemented according to a Ricardian 
regime and therefore, these empirical results could not validate the FTPL hypothesis.  
 
An approach similar to the one implemented by Mélitz (2000) is also adopted by Creel 
and Sterdyniak (2000), who mention that fiscal policy could be characterised by a 
Ricardian regime in Germany and in the US, and by a non-Ricardian regime in France. 
Additionally, another possible reading of the results presented by these two authors 
might be the conclusion that fiscal policy may have been, in the past, sustainable in 
Germany and not sustainable in France.23 
 
4.2 - Some evidence for the EU-15 
 
After the 1st of January 1999 several European currencies gave way to the Euro. Eleven 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) successfully met the convergence criteria underlined 
in the Maastricht Treaty and, according to the decisions of the European Council of 
May 1998, those countries were the founders of Economic and Monetary Union. Four 
other countries of the European Union remained outside the Euro either, because they 
wanted, United Kingdom and Denmark, or because they did not fulfil the convergence 
                                                        
22 Indeed, Cochrane (1998) mentions that the estimations of the equations for the real interest rate 
and for the rate growth of consumption are not statistically very robust. 
23 This is in fact one of the conclusions presented by Afonso (2000). 
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criteria, Greece and Sweden. At the beginning of 2001, Greece also joined the Euro and 
at the beginning of 2002 the euro was physically introduced into circulation. 
 
The idea of implementing causality tests between real government debt and the real 
primary surplus, implied  in the VAR models mentioned above, is not an easy approach 
to assess the possibility of the FTPL. In fact, both these variables are part of the present 
value borrowing constraint, a constraint that in the end holds true in any fiscal regime, 
either Ricardian or non-Ricardian. Since we are concerned with the EU-15 countries, a 
possible strategy might be to pool the data and use panel models along with some 
plausible testable assumptions. 
 
In order to assess the possibility of the FTPL for the EU-15, panel data are used for the 
primary budget surplus, as a percentage of GDP, and for the debt-to-GDP ratio, between 
1970 and 2001.24 I use therefore 32 years of annual observations for 15 countries. 
 
The existence of differences between the several countries is taken into account, by 
allowing that the autonomous term changes from country to country, in each cross-
section sample, in order to capture those individual country characteristics. A tentative 
model is given by the following equation, 
 
 itititiit uBSS +++= −− 11 θδβ , (35) 
 
where S is the primary surplus as a percentage of GDP, B is the debt-to-GDP ratio, the 
index i denotes the country, the index t indicates the period and βi stands for the 
individual effects to be estimated for each country i, in order to test: 
 
i) if θ = 0, the budget surplus does not react to the level of public debt, then the 
price level could be determined by the government budget constraint; 
ii) if θ > 0, the government tries to increase the budget surplus in order to act in 
react to the existing stock of public debt and comply with the budget constraint, 
this could be seen as a sign of a regime of monetary dominance. 
                                                        




Table 3 reports the results regarding the estimation of equation (35).  
 
Table 3  – Estimation of equation (35), dependent variable: primary surplus as a 


































F a test   3,406* 
(14,428) 
 











The t statistics are in parentheses. 
a - The degrees of freedom for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed 
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for 
all countries, which is the null hypothesis. 
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the 
Hausman statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here the null 
hypothesis. 
* - Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the null hypothesis of the pooled regression 
model is rejected. 
** - Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, the null hypothesis is rejected (random 
effects model), that is, one rejects the hypothesis that the autonomous terms in each country is 
not correlated with the independent explanatory variables (in this case the random effects model 
does not produce unbiased and consistent estimators). 
 
Notice that one can not reject the hypothesis θ > 0, since this coefficient is indeed 
statistically different from zero and positive. In other words, the EU-15 governments 
seem to act in accordance with the existing stock of public debt, by increasing the 
budget surplus as a result of increases in the outstanding stock of public debt. This is 
also consistent with a Ricardian regime, where fiscal policy adjusts to the intertemporal 
budget constraint, preventing for that reason the determination of the price level through 
the budget constraint. 
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Table 3 reports also the results for the random effects model. The feasibility of the 
random effects model is assessed by the Hausman statistic, which tests the null 
hypothesis that the random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. In 
our case, and taking into account the fact that the test statistic is significant at the 1 per 
cent level, the random effects model hypothesis is rejected, in favour of the fixed effects 
model. 
 
Additionally, one may also try to estimate the following model 
 
 itititiit vBSB +++= −− 11 ϕγα , (36) 
 
where S is the primary surplus as a percentage of GDP, B is the debt-to-GDP ratio, the 
index i denotes the country, the index t indicates the period and αi stands for the 
individual effects to be estimated for each country i. One may then put forward the 
following ideas: 
 
i) the hypothesis of a Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, is not rejected 
when γ < 0, most likely the government is using budget surpluses to reduce 
outstanding public debt; 
ii) with 0≥γ , there might be a non-Ricardian regime, that is, a regime of fiscal 
dominance. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of equation (36). The possibility of the fixed 
effects model seems to get more statistical validation as one may confirm by the value 
of the F statistic. This is a test of the null hypothesis that all effects are the same for 
each country, in other words, the hypothesis that all autonomous terms αi for equation 
(36) are identical.25  
 
 
                                                        
25 The F statistic is computed as F (n-1, nT-n-k)=[(Ru
2-Rp
2)/(1- Ru
2)][(nT-n-k)/(n-1)], where u stands 
for the model without restrictions, p denotes the pooled regression, that is the model with the 
restriction that there is only one autonomous term, n is the number of countries, T is the number of 
periods and k is the number of exogenous variables (see for instance, Greene (1997) and Johnston 
and DiNardo (1997)). 
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F a test   3,904* 
(14,429) 
 











The t statistics are in parentheses. 
a - The degrees of freedom for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed 
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for 
all countries, which is the null hypothesis. 
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the 
Hausman statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here the null 
hypothesis. 
* - Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the null hypothesis of the pooled regression 
model is rejected. 
** - Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, the null hypothesis is rejected (random 
effects model), that is, one rejects the hypothesis that the autonomous terms in each country is 
not correlated with the independent explanatory variables (in this case the random effects model 
does not produce unbiased and consistent estimators). 
 
From the results presented above one may see that there is some evidence in favour of a 
Ricardian regime, of monetary dominance, and that the EU-15 governments have a 
tendency to use primary budget surplus to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio, since we get a 
negative sign for the estimated γ coefficient (-0,766, in the fixed effects model) for 
equation (36). There is therefore no evidence that can be regarded as supporting the 
FTPL for this set of European countries. 
 
The fixed effects model is a typical choice for macroeconomists, and may eventually be 
more adequate than the random effects model. For instance, if the individual effects are 
somehow a substitute for non-specified variables, it is probable that each country 
specific effects are correlated with the other independent variables. In addition, and 
since the country sample includes all the relevant countries, the EU-15 countries, it is 
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less obvious that one might want to consider this set of countries as a random sample of 
a larger universe of countries.  
 
In other words, and as reminded by Greene (1997) and Judson and Owen (1997), when 
the individual observations sample (countries in our case) comes from a larger 
population (which could be instance all the developed countries), it would be suitable to 
consider the specific constant terms as randomly distributed through the cross section 
units. However, and even if the present country sample includes a small number of 
countries, it is sensible to admit that the EU-15 countries have similar specific 
characteristics, not shared by the other countries in the world. In this case, it would 
seem adequate to choose the fixed effects formalization, even if it is not correct to 
generalize the results afterwards, to the entire population, which is not the purpose of 
the paper.   
 
In the previous specification there is nevertheless an implicit assumption that the 
underlying model is homogeneous that is, the coefficients are the same for all countries. 
As a matter of fact, one of the problems with panel data estimations, as mentioned 
namely by Haque, Pesaran and Shrama (2000), is the possibility of the real model might 
be heterogeneous, with different coefficients for the explanatory variables in the cross-
section dimension. Assuming the same coefficients for all the countries, with the 
exception of the intercept, may give rise to non-linearity in the estimations, even if the 
relation between the variables is linear. An alternative estimator, proposed by Pesaran 
and Smith (1995), the mean group estimator, is based on the separate estimation of the 
coefficients for each cross-section unit, through the least squares method, and then 
computing the arithmetic mean of those coefficients. Still, this alternative procedure, 
does not allow for the hypothesis that some of the coefficients may indeed be the same 
for several countries. 
 
Besides the problem mentioned above, and to circumvent the potential non-stationarity 
problem arising from the time-series dimension of the data, empirical models in the 
literature are usually estimated with the first differences of the variables. Even so, in 
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most cases this procedure does not fully solve the problem.26 Also, the alternative of 
using variables in first differences might not take into account the fact that there is a 
levels relation between the government budget balance and the stock of outstanding 
public debt, through the present value borrowing constraint. 
 
Another version of equation (36) was therefore estimated, using the first differences of 
the original variables 
 
 itititiit wbksxb ϖ+++= −− 11 , (37) 
 
where xi gives now the individual effects for each country i, and bit=Bit-Bit-1 and sit=Sit-
Sit-1. 
 
Table 5  – Estimation of equation (37), dependent variable: first difference of the 


































F a test   0,460 
(14,413) 
 











The t statistics are in parentheses. 
a - The degrees of freedom for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed 
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for 
all countries, which is the null hypothesis. 
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the 
Hausman statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here the null 
hypothesis. 
                                                        
26 Some papers dealing with the properties of estimators, and recent developments in panel unit root 
tests and cointegration tests in panel data models are, for example, Alvarez and Arellano (1998), 




From the results results for the estimation of equation (37), presented in Table 5, one 
can draw some tentative additional conclusions. With the variables in first differences, 
both the pooled regression and the random effects models are chosen against the fixed 
effects model, since respectively the F and Hausman test statistics are not statistically 
significant. Also, the estimated coefficient k for the primary surplus maintains its 
negative sign in all models. This can once more be seen as evidence against the 
validation of the FTPL hypothesis for EU-15 countries. 
 
Also, it is possible to think of another test to assess empirically the FTPL. As already 
mentioned, the FTPL stresses the point that the price level could be determined by 
equation (31). For instance, if the government raises taxes then, according to that 
equation, there should be a price level decrease, resulting from the fact that the fiscal 
surplus is also higher. That is, if it is possible to observe a sustained negative correlation 
between prices and fiscal revenues one could conclude that there is in place a non-
Ricardian fiscal policy, supporting the idea of the FTPL. However, if there is instead a 
regime of monetary dominance, the price level should be independent from the 
evolution of the government revenues. 
 
A possible specification to test the hypothesis mentioned above could be the following 
equation 
 
 ititRitpiit RPP εωωλ +++= −− 11 , (38) 
 
where P is the average annual change of the price deflator of private final consumption 
expenditure and R is the first difference of total public receipts as a percentage of GDP.  
 
The results of the estimation of equation (38), presented in Table 6, show that the price 
level does not seem to have a statistically significant relation with the government 
revenues. This is true for the pooled regression, fixed effects and random effects 
versions, even though now the fixed effects model is not statistically better when 
compared against the other two versions. Furthermore, such a relation, even if 
significant at the 10 per cent level, is nevertheless positive, and not negative, as one 
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would expect if the price level adjusted upwards after a decrease in public revenues. 
Therefore, one could hardly decide, with this evidence, for the validation of the FTPL in 
the EU-15 countries. 
 


































F a test   0,683 
(14,439) 
 











The t statistics are in parentheses. 
a - The degrees of freedom for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed 
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for 
all countries, which is the null hypothesis. 
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the 
Hausman statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here the null 
hypothesis. 
* - Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
** - Statistically significant (only) at the 10 per cent level, the null hypothesis is rejected 
(random effects model), that is, one rejects the hypothesis that the autonomous terms in each 
country are not correlated with the independent explanatory variables (in this case the random 
effects model does not produce unbiased and consistent estimators). 
 
5 - Conclusion 
 
The FTPL, credited mainly to the work of LSW, confers the government budget 
constraint a key role in determining the price level. This is a relatively recent subject in 
macroeconomics, nevertheless with increasing discussions in the literature.27 The more 
active supporters of the theory (namely Woodford, Sims and Cochrane) argue that in a 
non-Ricardian fiscal regime, the price level is determined by the ratio between nominal 
                                                        
27 The topic is already mentioned in a chapter of the Handbook of Macroeconomics (see McCallum 
[1999a]) and in the macroeconomics manual of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). 
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public debt (or the government liabilities) and the present value of future primary fiscal 
surpluses (including possible seigniorage revenues). The criticisms of the FTPL appear 
to be more intense when the Central Bank decides to adopt an active strategy in 
determining the nominal interest rate. 
 
As many new topics and theories in economics, this is a rather controversial issue since 
it directly questions the ability of monetary policy and of the quantitative theory of 
money to explain and determine the price level. There are therefore already several 
papers opposing this discussion of the monetary ortodoxy, being worthwile to mention 
again McCallum and Buiter among the more hard-hearted critics. 
 
Probably the main contribution of the FTPL, in its criticism of the quantitative theory of 
money, is to discuss if the the price level may be determined, in part, and under some 
given conditions, by fiscal policy. However, to distinguish between if the supply of 
money and the interest rate are determined by fiscal policy or if the money supply and 
interest rate are determined exogenously, it is not an easy point to assess either 
theoretically or empirically. All in all, the theoretical assumptions required for the 
existence of non-Ricardian regimes, where fiscal policy is actively determining the price 
level, regardless of monetary policy, seem rather tricky to agree with. 
 
Concerning the empirical assessment of the FTPL, the very few papers that atempted 
that validation (for the US and for some OECD countries), with VAR models, conclude 
for the existance of regimes of monetary dominance. This paper adds to the literature by 
tentatively trying to test with panel data models, the feasibility of the FTPL for the EU-
15 countries. The results for the period 1970-2001 show, however, that the data allow 
the rejection of some of the testable hypothesis used to validate the FTPL. In other 











Annex - statistical sources 
 
- Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest payments of general 
government (Percentage of gross domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 
1.0.310.0.UBLGI. 
 
- Public debt; ESA 95; Maastricht and former definition (linked series) (Percentage of 
gross domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1.0.310.0.UDGGL. 
 
- Total public receipts (Percentage of gross domestic product at market prices). 
AMECO Code: 1.0.310.0.UTCTF. 
 
- Price deflator of private final consumption expenditure. National currency. Index 
number. AMECO Code: 3.1.0.0.PCPH. 
 
Source: AMECO (ANNUAL MACRO ECONOMIC DATABASE): European 
Commission, Directorate General, Economic and Financial Affairs, Directorate A: 
Economic studies and research; Unit 2: Economic databases and statistical co-
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